费尔巴哈的提纲心得体会_15篇精选_双语翻译

在深入阅读了费尔巴哈的提纲之后，我深感其深邃的思想和独到的见解。费尔巴哈以其犀利的笔触剖析了人类存在的本质，提出了关于自由意志与物质条件辩证关系的重要观点。他的思想犹如一道光，照亮了我对于生命意义和宇宙秩序的理解。通过他的提纲，我不仅学会了如何去思考问题，更重要的是学会了如何去生活，去感受这个世界的美好与复杂。这不仅仅是一篇心得体会，更是一次心灵的洗礼，让我对生活有了更加深刻的认识和感悟。

After reading Feuerbach's syllogism in depth, I am deeply impressed by its profound thoughts and unique insights. With his sharp strokes, Feuerbach analyzed the nature of human existence and put forward an important viewpoint on the dialectical relationship between free will and material conditions. His thoughts were like a light that illuminated my understanding of the meaning of life and the order of the universe. Through his syllabus, I learned not only how to think about problems, but more importantly, how to live and feel the beauty and complexity of this world. This is not only an insight, but also a spiritual baptism, which gives me a deeper understanding and sense of life.

费尔巴哈的提纲心得体会 篇1

　　摘要：

　　费尔巴哈的宗教人类学又被称作人道主义。他以伦理关系解释基督教的三位一体，用类意识取代基督，用同情取代上帝的博爱。本文阐述费尔巴哈人道主义的核心观念，讨论这种道德世界观的思想特征，它对语言和传统人文教育的颠覆。

　　关键词：

　　互为存在|身体|同情|语言

　　他我及其共同体，换句话说是费尔巴哈的人及其社会。费尔巴哈的人是感性的人，只有通过你的理解才意识到自己，所以，我在费尔巴哈那里实质上是“他我”，其社会是你和我的感性共同体。维系这个共同体的基础是什么？费尔巴哈仍旧把道德作为人际关系的基础。然而，对于不再具备传统自我意识的人，道德首先是理解和同情的要求，起源于我和你的互为存在。费尔巴哈用人类学系统地揭示了人的依赖感，并把人类学放到宗教哲学的高度，以人的类意识取代人格概念，建立了社会的人的道德世界观。这里，真正的行动主体是身体，身体性作为感性语言成为社会的理解基础。

　　一、上帝作为人的存在

　　费尔巴哈的宗教哲学以感性的原始性为基础，他强调感性原始性是给定的“秘密”。在《基督教的本质》和《宗教的本质》中，他把这些秘密阐释为自然的直接性和他我。与思辨的宗教哲学和基督教神话相区别，费尔巴哈认为宗教是人的本质的异化，而人的本质这里已经从传统的精神中解放出来，把自己理解为自然本质。因为意识到人的自然基础，所以，人成为神的历史的真正主题。在神的历史中，神学的本质已经作为人的本质得到了实现。“Homohominiduesest(人对于人是上帝)——这是最高的实践原理，是世界历史的转折点。”在共性中的人，也就是人类，不仅是费尔巴哈的理性尺度，而且成为他的宗教的最高对象。

　　费尔巴哈排斥在神学意义上的哲学，一方面他反感黑格尔的科学体系，另一方面却抓住黑格尔的《哲学全书》中的自然，把它作为在人类学意义上的新哲学的主体规定。自然在与精神的关系中是诗性的，费尔巴哈把自然的诗性仅仅当作一种限制丢弃了，于是，自然作为生存只具有外在必然性的特征。黑格尔《哲学全书》的自然是精神的最高自由的舍身外化，精神知道自身的界限，知道自我牺牲；而费尔巴哈的自然既是需求的对象，也是种种需求的基础。作为基础，自然保持为秘密，无法透视，并且正因如此而激发无穷的激情，感性的人在这种激情中感觉到他的自由。这样一种自然依赖性渗入情感之中直至变成谜，它又为费尔巴哈所发现，成为其宗教的根据。“自然不仅是第一和原始的对象，它也一直是根据，持久的，即使是隐蔽的，它是宗教的背景。”对这样一种背景的发现，在费尔巴哈的意义上是对基础的意识，而基础作为不同于思想的他在不仅不可扬弃，而且完全和思想相分离并且把思想贬低为一种置后的观念——意识形态。所谓的思想不再有自身的现实性。生存取代了理念的位置，自然的外在性似乎成为一种整体的启示，这个整体就是人的需求——费尔巴哈所认为的内在必然性。自然所启示的宗教性是激情，而激情又被当作“生存的真实符号”为生存自身的作证，并且被提升为人的神性。

　　真理对于费尔巴哈是人的需求——在原则意义上的人的需求，也就是作为人类学的世界观。它把由自然基础来理解的人作为它的原则。宗教在人类学中的瓦解是通过谓词向主语的倒转来实现的。“主语是什么，这只在谓词中；谓词是主语的真理。主语现在是人格化的、生存的谓词。”于是，所谓神学的主体和人的主体之间的种种矛盾只是由于对谓词的不同解释，可以用心理病理学来消解它们。费尔巴哈在基督教思想中看到的是近代哲学的宗教意识：他们只通过这个原则的中介来思考一切。”经过中介的知是建立在感性基础上的宗教的真正敌人，感性的人的宗教处在与思辨神学的对立中。神学把主体区别于人，而这一区别的根据在于宗教的知，这种知是上帝自身所有的，必须通过启示才向人的认识开放。而费尔巴哈以启蒙的风格断言信仰是迷信。奇迹的万能被归结在近代主体性之下，被进一步评判为人的任意武断的力量。为了克服所谓主观主义，费尔巴哈加工出新的宗教哲学，它与心理学或者人类学没有区别，而且就是人类学自身。

　　宗教观念的起源在人的类本质中充分显示出来，类本质被设想为无穷的互为存在。对上帝的信仰因此不是别的，正是人对自身的信仰，而这个自身是类本质。费尔巴哈所倡导的宗教是社会的人的信仰。费尔巴哈把宗教只看作是由实践立场出发的宗教世界观，它以道德为规定。“信仰理论是对上帝的义务的理论，上帝是信仰的最高义务。……对上帝的义务处在与普通人的义务的冲突中……”就发现了上帝实际上是普通人的病理因素而言，所谓义务的对立作为纯粹抽象的思想之物已经丧失了其有效性。与费尔巴哈的起源学的批判相适应，基督教教义被还原到其自然的源泉，从心理学上看是爱的基本需求。对人的爱被设想为上帝的道德上的善。善虽然并不关系到我的良心，但是关系着人道。没有了我自身，良心已经变得不可能；这里的人道指完整的人的要求，人作为自然本质是个别的人，他需要他人。在世界观的宗教里，个体组成的社会占据了国家的位置，国家的意义被架空了，它不再是全民族的代表。社会代表着大多数他人并且扮演着道德的上帝的角色。

　　基督教的爱的戒律转而变成受苦的戒律，并且是在这样一种尺度上：“为他人受苦是神性的”。因此，受苦被看作是爱的动因并且最终转到前台，成为第一决定者。费尔巴哈强调受苦和被动性是世界的原则，它在主体性的对立面，亦即客体性的原则。相应地，他的宗教批判集中在作为人格神的基督身上。因为圣子代表着个体性和身体性，上帝的爱发源于对圣子的爱，所以，费尔巴哈认为三位一体中的第二位人格应该是第一位。作为现实的上帝，基督成为费尔巴哈的无限制的感性——也就是想象——的对象。“基督是亲身为人所知的上帝，基督因而是极乐的确定性，确定上帝存在并且就像情感所要所需求的那样存在。”受苦变成了想象的奢侈的享受，上帝在想象中出现在基督的形象中，而上帝是互为存在的类概念，基督则是个体的人，于是类体现在个体身上。这种经验的现实性缺乏任何世界性当下，相反，它否认在世行动的我对自我的责任。十字架上的死丧失了历史的规定性并且只是基督教世界观从心理学上论证的后果——这就是：用人的血的苦难来为生存提供担保。因此，耶稣仅仅被理解为拯救者，而拯救不过是魔术师的奇迹，这位魔术师自己需要人的苦难来炫耀自身。“奇妙的拯救者是业已实现的情感的奇迹，不受道德法则的约束，……以绝对主观的、情感的方式得到拯救。”至此，信仰只是主观的善行或者心理学上的奇迹。

　　二、类意识

　　费尔巴哈把信仰解释成为对奇迹的信仰，也就是想象的自由，接着又把他所称道的感性的理性自由放到宗教和形而上学的位置上。意识不是抽象能力的自由，而是相反，它以自然的人为基础。思想不再是人的创造性的标志，而只是“人的本质的必然后果和特性”。人的本质作为受到限制的个体是有缺陷的贫乏的，它的完美和积极行动表现在类的生命之中。类，它被设想为自由的主体，其相应的此在只在人性的全体性中，因此，类也是感性的理性的最高对象。如果人因为缺乏世界观教育而混淆了想象和现实，不知道类的概念，那么，只有上帝概念可以取代类。科学应该首先把“没有教养的主观的人”带向直观。当然，只要第一现实的事物对于费尔巴哈是身体，类的生命就以性别差异为根据。费尔巴哈人类学的爱的狂热由此产生，这种人类学把人际间的行为态度当作是宗教的，并且由此而获得一种建立在身体性上的伦理学。用费尔巴哈的话说：“伦理的基础是性别差异。”

　　费尔巴哈认为基督教的历史是人性的受难史，这种苦难造成“基督教中类和个体的直接同一性”。费尔巴哈在这里看到类为了个体而牺牲，这也是神学历史的结束。由于起源-批判的哲学并不把上帝的人化看作是人的友爱的根据，而只是考虑身体的心理效应，这种哲学发现了奇迹的秘密：“是类把爱灌注给我。……基督作为爱的意识就是类意识。……我们的同一性的意识。”相反，基督教的启示变为在时间历史上已成过去的事实，变成一度曾信仰的上帝存在，它否定了人的生存。把爱的感觉上升为意识，这构成新哲学的本质和它的宽容。费尔巴哈认为基督教也具有主体性的特征，与身体性相隔绝的主体性是不宽容的。感性的意识在起源学上和感觉结合在一起，人类学意义上的感觉是身体的作用。这样的意识处在其自身确定性的对立面，而费尔巴哈指责确定性只是主观确定性，而感性意识直接说出的是精神的另一方，另一方以自然的名义出现并且是物质基础。这样一种基础观念克服了主体性。由于执着于意识的直接性，对中介者的需求消失了，中介者不过是神学反思的客体，是由对象化而异化的人的形象。身体作为主体，也是首创者，可以直接地被感觉到。它生存在时间和空间里，始终把持着现实性，不过这种现实性也在时间和空间中流失。

　　“身体是根据，人格的主体。”这种对近代哲学的意识的颠倒同时也抹杀了近代意识的自由和它对自身的知的肯定，也就是经过反思中介而获得真理的确定性。根据作为源泉而直接地出现，排斥任何与自身的沟通和中介。与《精神现象学》的感性确定性相区别，人类学的绝对直接性并不促成任何对自身的证明。基础只是为直接意识提供保障，但是没有论证。身体和意识都只是抽象地在片面性中加以理解，它们没有任何权利和近代的主体概念相提并论，后者在谓词中把自身具体化了。而在费尔巴哈这里，身体从神学的知中解放出来，呈现着身体的人及其所有困境。在“身体”这个词下面是众多他者的复数，费尔巴哈把他们命名为“你”。“他者是我的你——……在他者身上我才有人性的意识。”“我”丧失了任何由确定性带来的自我控制，分散到他者的多样性中，众多他者之间的关系体现了在社会形式中的众多需求。我首先是你；我承受着他者。为激情所掌握，我才变得积极行动，不过这个我立刻又瓦解成为你或者某个他者的对象。运动的轨迹是从对象到对象，从你到你。这里根本谈不上在主体意义上的意识，虽然费尔巴哈用类来美化他者：“他者是类的代表，即使他是一个人，却代替了我对众多他者的渴求……”如此之评论表露了类概念的彷徨无助。类没有支撑点，它的现实性必须不断地被取代，“类在无限制地众多而不同类型的个体身上实现自己，类本质的无限性公开在这里。”“类的代表”是一种再现，可是这种再现及其对象的替换顺序无法像在近代哲学中那样由先行的反思来检验，这里无从谈起再现的同一性。费尔巴哈所说的现实性具有假相的特征，是现实性的替代品。

　　类的总体表达出个体的多数。它虽然有互为存在的形式上的统一性，却作为相互分离的个体而生存。“只在多数的真理中有人的真理。”菲尔巴哈认为统一性是要求类为个体而牺牲，这对于费尔巴哈意味着他所认为的主体性的罪过，具体说是把多数排斥在统一之外。他这样控诉三位一体：“人格仅仅在父子关系中产生，这意味着，人格概念这里只是相对的概念，是关系概念。……通过父子关系，人把自己贬低为一种相对的、不独立的、非人的本质。”人以这种方式为上帝而牺牲。按照费尔巴哈的观点，三位一体原本是“本质上的基本区别的总和，人在人的本质中感受到的区别。”一如这种本质只在形式上相互联系着，对于它不可能有在知的意义上的启示。类没有自身的现实性，而只有一种在性别差异上感受到的自我感觉。对上帝的敬畏消失在一种与上帝的你我关系之中，费尔巴哈曾庆祝这种上帝的人化，把它当作基督教的真正内容和最后的进步。三位一体对于他意味着“共同的社会生活的秘密——你对于我的必要性的秘密”。类和个别的人一样生活在时间中。正如类的生存分散在众多的人数上，类意识本质上与他人的意识相联系并且最终表明自己是一种认同的必要性。要求把宗教从思辨神学中解放出来，其目的是瓦解启示的上帝的三位一体的规定性，取消上帝的知本身，由此，真理的约束性被撤回到个体的人的意见之中。

　　对公众意见的参与，这构成了人的唯一结合点，也就是社会性。在意见中千差万别的人恰好不是以特殊性为标志，相反他无法忍受特殊性。感觉到为有限性所逼迫，他向别人传达这种困苦。这里，人与人的爱本质上是人之间的同情，尽管有生理上的隔离，人想以心理上的共通为基础塑造一种道德的人格。对于这样一种普遍性，黑格尔对市民社会的人所说的话也同样有效：“磨平特殊性，……是合理性的显露”，这种合理性负责各种需求的满足。这种人道主义意义上的道德在费尔巴哈这里上升到社会的人的宗教，它应该构成基督教的“超自然主义的利己主义”的对立面：“同情的情感，参与，因而是一种实体的、真实的、思辨的情感。”费尔巴哈在同情中看到所有差异都在消失，无论是政治的、宗教的或者是民族的区别。这样一种此在的普遍性应该扬弃自然的人的困境，那种和他的自然依赖性联系在一起的困境。从自然中解放从而获得自由，这同时意味着扬弃了自然的人及其宗教的基础。人的神性登上宗教的位置。“人和人——我和你的统一——是上帝。”这是费尔巴哈人类学的目标，这个目标应该作为人道主义的要求而成为全社会的共同意识。但是，只要类停留在类意识中，人的神性对于这种意识就作为一种在人的当下历史现实的彼岸的信仰，滑落到未来。目标僵化为意识形态而系缚于未来，而未来只是空洞的可能性的空间。

　　三、社会的神性

　　上帝作为人的存在成为资产阶级社会的现实偶像并且把古老的上帝贬低为想象的形象。在理性的普遍性要求的位置上出现的是爱的需求——与人分享和同情，这是社会的感性联系。费尔巴哈区别想象的感性和感性现实性。古老的上帝只是作为主观的人的病理学的想象，而类意识从事的是“物的真迹，原始语言”，这种语言是社会的理解基础。社会的人被设想为原始地理解自我的并且相互信任和依赖的客体。“只有在人和人说话的地方，只有在谈话中，在共同的行为中，理性才产生。问和答是首要的思想行动。原始地属于思想的两个人”。两个人是变成身体的感性语言，感性规定自身是他者的语言。按照新哲学的被动原则，关系总是从他者来，以第一性的你为出发点。“只有谓词的实在是生存的保障”，费尔巴哈的上帝由此而成为“物自体”。这个人类学的物自体自身出现在展示功能中，作为你，一种漫无节制多数，只通过空间的相互排斥来巩固各自的现实性。因此，现实中的你所表达的是生存的相互分离和漠然。由你所代表的思想从来不关系着所有人，而是只能够分为我的意见和他的意见，意见的原始性所意味的不是别的，只是众人态度的彼此排斥的众多立场，每一个人都是他人，作为你而走进视线。

　　费尔巴哈的世界观是一个空间地点差异的经济系统。“地点规定是第一个理性规定”，这里的理性规定完全落到外在性的片面性中。针对黑格尔，费尔巴哈强调：“没有空间的分离的地方，也就没有逻辑。”他的逻辑是单纯的外在必然性，分割空间并且划定时间的先后。“这里是我，那里是你；我们是分离的；因此我们能够是两人，相互没有损害；有足够的位置。”在这些位置上人人皆是他的所有。通过位置的划分，人们终于由衷地理解了费尔巴哈的宗教的爱，它表达的是一种占有欲：“两人，差异是宗教的源泉——你是我的上帝，显然没有你，我就不存在；我依赖你；没有你——没有我。”这种爱从分离状态的无法忍受的经验出发，是对对象的激情，这些对象让人梦想人和人的共同体，而这个共同体就是互为存在。所谓的人的自然依赖性看到的只是自然的用途，自然是由感性的人的世界所决定的。人，他依恋着人的互为存在的抽象同一，于是在自然基础的设想中为他所执着的观念寻找一个稳固的支撑点，然而这个抽象的共同体观念在费尔巴哈的空间世界体系之外并没有位置。然而，“你一无所有，就一无所是。”这种痛苦使基础的设想越出所有的观念而成为自然之谜，痛苦在费尔巴哈的意识中得到美化，而意识作为对理性的暴力越过了认识的边界，从而成为狂热。

　　相对于逻辑思想的语言，费尔巴哈突出了存在的不可言说。他认为逻辑语言作为理性的中介行为因为没有激情也就没有自为的根据。基础是前思想的，因而也是不可言说的存在，它只在感性缔造的我和你的共同体中吐露自己的秘密。人的本质带上了动词意义——展示存在的秘密。“在话语停止的地方，生活才开始，存在的秘密才打开自己。……生存即使没有可言说性也具有自为的意义和理性。”生存的理性就是感性，为你所激发而在冲动中发言。“语言……不是别的而就是类的实现，我和你的沟通，以便通过扬弃类的个体的隔绝而表现类的统一。”表现的手段是形象和属于形象的想象力。两者都是再创造的，它们起源于身体及其激情。对于费尔巴哈，思想只以形象来说话。思想只表达爱的需求，与爱的需求相适应，形象是偶像，偶像在想象中满足爱的需求并且让欲望变成自我享受。“在类本身的意识产生的地方，耶稣就消失了，而他的真正本质没有失去；因为他曾是类意识的代理人”。这种对语言本质的颠覆力图把感性和理性完全分开，从而把两者都加以物化，以便于随意操纵。因此，语言作为类的共同行动被赋予了革命的力量，语言掌握着人性。

　　“说是自由的行动；话语自身是自由。”艺术和宗教曾是绝对者的知的形态，是绝对科学的本质组成部分。而这里的说和言从源泉上脱离了作为绝对知的形态的艺术和宗教。相反，费尔巴哈宣称：“只有多神论，所谓的偶像崇拜，是艺术和科学的起源。”意识变成了血和肉，才在感性共同体中出现。这让费尔巴哈梦想一种新的诗和艺术，然而，迄今为止在更高更卓越的再现的意义上的新颖艺术仍然是既无法认识、因而也没有实现的意图。可是，经过新的阐释，古老的上帝和与他的知紧密相关的艺术变得不值得相信了。不是建立一个新的知的形态，而是用群众性歪曲精神的普遍性。这样一种对历史之知的滥用是虚无主义的真正起因。虚无主义成为尼采的主题，而尼采把它作为一种撞击，历史的危机促使他去创造新的信仰，但是他在历史考察中却没有能够打破历史连续性的假象。一如哲学沦为丧失精神的世界观，宗教和艺术也必然被架空，成为意识形态及其偶像崇拜。意识形态是建立在希望之上的上层建筑，它掩饰现实的非真理性，不愿把握现实，而是去经验现实。知识人团体崇尚的所谓的审美直观培养的不是艺术家，而是制造幻想的戏子，因为他把意识形态场景化并搬上舞台，为了得到观众的承认而伪装自己，所以他的欺骗完全是有意识的。无数的偶像被当作“你”而制造出来，却没有一个现实的人的我自身。操纵手段显示出自由的魅力，然而这种假象只局限于这样一个范围，它在服务于社会的自我保存冲动时才有效。不过对于费尔巴哈，自我保存的冲动恰是道德的原则。戏子的语言代表着大众的意见，只有这样他才获得观众。因此，他必须不断地替换“你”，以满足大众。

　　在自我教养的意识从科学中退出之后，科学也变成工具性的，即服务于对对象的操纵，也效力于对人的控制。人只还在没有我自身的类中寻找自身。他的摹本不再是上帝，而是同类，结伴而居的社会的人。人的同一性不再是人格意义上的，而是被理解为多数人的相同的生活表达。后者是社会的基本思想。这首先表现在人的语言上，语言是社会意识的宣传工具。“语言是衡量人性教育的水准有多高多低的标准。”近代自然理性的教养通过反思而构成科学，而反思是在严格的方法规则中的对象化。和自然理性的教养不同，感性的人对待科学自身就像对待直接现存的某物，所以，与自然意识的历史所显示的否定之否定相反，科学被称作为积极的实证科学。经过多方颠倒，理性自身舍身外化的思想退回到所谓思想的源泉，也就是人和他的同类。如此之追本溯源，在费尔巴哈看来是科学教育的任务，科学的经验是“没有假冒的客观的感性直观”，教育应该以这种科学经验为引导。费尔巴哈认为“教育依赖外部，有某些需求”。站在绝对的直接性立场上，无论是语言还是教育都丧失了中介性的位置，而正是在这一位置上语言和教育曾经作为知的形态而获得承认。费尔巴哈把与自然基础的关系当作真理的唯一标志树立起来。代替自然意识的自我教养的是感性的人的教育，而所谓教育只是占有一切现成的东西，尤其是自然科学和社会科学的研究成果。这些研究能够对感性世界观的通俗化做出贡献并且无限地扩展世界观的视阈。无限是在没有边际的意义上，通向未来的无限被当作是人性的进步，它以这样一个社会为前景，在这个社会中没有统治的人，而只有来源于“我和你”的上帝。

　　引用版本：

　　费尔巴哈全集（缩写FGW），学院出版社，柏林 1982

　　Feuerbach, Gesammelte Werke, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1982.

　　黑格尔全集，费利克斯·迈纳出版社，汉堡1980。

　　Hegel, Gesammelte Werke，Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1980.

　　《讲稿》，14卷，费利克斯·迈纳出版社，汉堡2000

　　Vorlesungen, Band 14, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2000.

　　尼采全集，历史考证版（缩写KGW），出版人科利，蒙提那利

　　Nietzsche Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW), Herausgegeben von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari.

　　封·伽格，M，《费尔巴哈，哲学和宗教批判》，新哲学，慕尼黑1970

　　von Gagern, Michael, Ludwig Feuerbach, Philosophie- und Religionskritik,

　　Die Neue Philosophie“, München 1970.

　　沙尔，C-A，《尼采的迷宫：原始的思和灵魂》，阿尔伯出版社，弗莱堡/慕尼黑1985

　　Scheier, Claus-Arthur, Nietzsches Labyrinth: das ursprüngliches Denken und die Seele, Alber, Freiburg, München 1985.

　　摘自《从人道主义世界观到现代对世界的省思——费尔巴哈、马克思和尼采》，南京大学出版社2006。

　　浅析费尔巴哈的唯物主义是何种意义上的旧唯

　　费尔巴哈的唯物主义是马克思主义哲学的重要思想渊源之一。然而,在马克思主义哲学研究和马克思主义哲学史研究中,费尔巴哈一直作为旧唯物主义的典型代表而受到批判。费尔巴哈的唯物主义究竟是何种意义上的旧唯物主义呢?厘清这一问题,对于正确评价费尔巴哈和马克思主义哲学的研究都具有重要的意义。

　　一

　　在青年黑格尔派当中,费尔巴哈率先展开对黑格尔思辨哲学的批判,结束了唯心主义在德国的长期统治,“直截了当地使唯物主义重新登上王座”(《马克思恩格斯选集》第4卷,第222页),并且“在他向黑格尔作第一次坚决进攻时以清醒的哲学来对抗醉醺醺的思辨”。(《马克思恩格斯全集》第2卷,第159页)费尔巴哈反对黑格尔把绝对理念当作哲学的出发点,而实际的存在却成了第二性的;他揭露出“在黑格尔这里,一种f等印早卑现象或存在的整体性、绝对性被当成了宾词,所以作为独立存在的各个发展阶段只具有二意义,只不过是作为一些影子、一些环节、一些以毒攻毒的点滴而继续存在于竿布阶段中。”(《士系巴哈哲学著作选集》上卷,第47页)在费尔巴哈看来,虽然黑格尔也主张主客体、精神与自然的统一,但他所说的自然只具有客体的意义,即为主体所设定的意义,而不是实在的存在。与黑格尔相反,他认为:“感性的、个别的存在的实在性,对于我们来说,是一个用我们的鮮牟来打图章担保的真理。”(同上,第68页)

　　二

　　一般认为费尔巴哈唯物主义因其具有形而上学性,而应把它归属于旧唯物主义。这种理解的依据有两个方面:一是恩格斯的有关论述。恩格斯曾把费尔巴哈的唯物主义归属于18世纪法国的唯物主义。由于费尔巴哈没有能完成“使关于社会的科学,即所谓历史科学和哲学科学的总和,同唯物主义的基础协调起来,并在这个基础上加以改造”的任务,“他虽然有唯物主义的基础,但是在这里还没有摆脱传统的唯心主义束缚”(《马克思恩格斯选集》第4卷,第226-227页),“我们一接触到费尔巴哈的宗教哲学和伦理学,他的真正的唯心主义就显露出来了”(同上,第229页)。费尔巴哈与法国唯物主义哲学家一样,“也停留在半路上,他下半截是唯物主义者,上半截是唯心主义者”(同上,第241页)。18世纪法国的唯物主义“第二个特有的局限性在于:它不能把世界理解为一种过程,理解为一种处在不断的历史发展中的物质。

　　三

　　在《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中,马克思明确指出:“从前的一切唯物主义(包括费尔巴哈的唯物主义)的主要缺点是:对对象、现实、感性,只是从客体的或直观的形式去理解,而不是把它们当作感性的人的活动,当作实践去理解,不是从主体方面去理解。”(《马克思恩格斯选集》第1卷,第54页)由于旧唯物主义把实践从人与人的感性世界的关系中排除出去,因此在解决思维与存在的关系时,只能把存在、感性世界看成是直观的对象,而不是看作实践活动的对象。

　　实践的观点是新唯物主义首要的基本的观点，“始终站在现实历史的基础上，不是从观念出发来解释实践，而是从物质实践出发来解释观念的东西”。(《马克思恩格斯选集》第1卷，第73页)马克思把费尔巴哈的唯物主义叫做“直观的唯物主义”，“即不是把感性理解为实践活动的唯物主义”。(同上，第56页)费尔巴哈唯物主义的直观性是其为旧唯物主义的根本原因。

　　费尔巴哈宁居僻壤不屈膝名人故事

　　1828年，费尔巴哈从柏林大学毕业后到爱尔兰根大学当了讲师。1830年，他匿名发表了《论死与不死》一文。这篇反对基督教的文章一发表，就引起了强烈的社会反响；进步的有识之士拍手叫绝，基督教会惊恐万状，德国反动当局大为震怒，立即查禁该文，追查作者的真实姓名，当获悉该文作者就是爱尔兰根大学讲师费尔巴哈时，马上粗暴地将费尔巴哈赶出了学门。 费尔巴哈并不因此气馁，他继续刻苦专研学问，奋力从事著述，从唯物主义立场出发，批判宗教神学和当时在思想界占统治地位的黑格尔唯心主义哲学，先后发表了《基督教的本质》、《黑格尔哲学批判》、《宗教的本质》等著作和许多论文，恢复了唯物主义的权威，赢得了很高的社会声誉，许多大学教授和学生们都希望让他回大学执教。但是，反动当局置这一切于不顾，顽固地不让费尔巴哈重返大学讲坛。

　　费尔巴哈十分清楚德国反动当局的卑鄙目的，他向好心的人们说过，要解决他的"讲课问题，只有用政治上的奴颜婢膝和宗教上的蒙昧愚顽的代价"才能实现，而他自己是决-德育名人小故事

　　不会为了重返大学讲坛，就不惜放弃自己反宗教的立场、向反动当局"垂眉折腰"的。为了忠实于自己的信念，费尔巴哈毅然放弃了重进大学宣传他的哲学主张的想法，在1837年移居到绍林吉亚邦的布鲁克堡村。在那里，他孤寂地生活了二十五年，以甘居穷乡僻壤的行动，实践了他决不向基督教会和德国反动当局屈膝妥协的决心，表现了他的英勇气节。

Feuerbach's outline experience Part 1

　　Abstracts:

　　Feuerbach's anthropology of religion is also known as humanism. He explains the Christian Trinity in terms of ethical relations, replacing Christ with class consciousness and God's fraternity with compassion. This paper elaborates on the core concepts of Feuerbachian humanism and discusses the ideological features of this moral worldview, its subversion of language and traditional humanistic education.

　　Keywords:

　　Mutual Presence|Body|Compassion|Language

　　The other self and its community, in other words, Feuerbach's man and his society. Feuerbach's man is a sensual man who realizes himself only through your understanding, so I am essentially the "other self" in Feuerbach, and his society is the sensual community of you and me. What is the basis of this community? Feuerbach continues to use morality as the basis of human relations. However, for people who no longer have a traditional sense of self, morality is first and foremost a requirement of understanding and empathy, originating in the mutual existence of I and Thou. Feuerbach used anthropology to systematically reveal man's sense of dependence and put anthropology on the level of philosophy of religion, replacing the concept of personhood with man's class-consciousness and establishing a moral worldview of the social man. Here, the real subject of action is the body, and corporeality as a language of sensibility becomes the basis of social understanding.

　　I. The existence of God as a human being

　　Feuerbach's philosophy of religion is based on the primordiality of sensibility, which he emphasizes as the "secrets" of the given. In The Essence of Christianity and The Essence of Religion, he explains these secrets as the immediacy of nature and the other self. In contrast to the discursive philosophy of religion and the Christian myth, Feuerbach sees religion as an alienation of man's nature, which here has freed itself from the traditional spirit and understood itself as a natural essence. Because of the realization of the natural basis of man, man becomes the true subject of the history of God. In the history of God, the essence of theology has been realized as the essence of man. "Homohominiduesest (man for man is God)-this is the highest practical principle, the turning point in the history of the world." Man in communion, that is, mankind, is not only Feuerbach's measure of reason, but becomes the supreme object of his religion.

　　Rejecting philosophy in the theological sense, Feuerbach, on the one hand, resents Hegel's system of science, but on the other hand, seizes upon nature in Hegel's Philosophia as the subject-matter of the new philosophical prescriptions in the anthropological sense. Nature is poetic in its relation to spirit; Feuerbach discards the poetry of nature as a mere limitation, and so nature as existence is characterized only by external necessity. The nature of Hegel's Complete Philosophy is the surrendered externalization of the highest freedom of the spirit, which knows its own limits and self-sacrifice; whereas Feuerbach's nature is at once the object of need and the basis of all kinds of need. As a basis, nature remains secret, imperceptible, and as such inspires the infinite passions in which the sensual man feels his freedom. Such a natural dependence seeps into the emotions until it becomes a mystery, and it is discovered by Feuerbach as the basis of his religion. "Nature is not only the first and original object, it has also been the ground, the enduring, if hidden, background of religion." The discovery of such a background is, in Feuerbach's sense, the consciousness of the ground, which, as an otherness distinct from thought, is not only unavoidable, but is entirely separate from thought and reduces it to an afterthought-idea-ideology. The so-called idea no longer has a reality of its own. Survival takes the place of the idea, and the externality of nature seems to become a revelation of the whole, the whole of which is man's need - the inner necessity according to Feuerbach. The religious nature of nature's revelation is the passions, which in turn are taken as the "true symbols of existence" to bear witness to existence itself, and are elevated to the divine nature of man.

　　Truth for Feuerbach is a human need - a human need in the sense of a principle, that is, as an anthropological worldview. It takes as its principle the human being understood by its natural basis. The disintegration of religion in anthropology is realized by the inversion of the predicate to the subject. "What the subject is, this is only in the predicate; the predicate is the truth of the subject. The subject is now the predicate of personification and survival." Thus all the contradictions between the so-called theological subject and the human subject are only due to different interpretations of the predicate, and psychopathology can be used to dissolve them. What Feuerbach sees in Christian thought is the religious consciousness of recent philosophers: they think of everything only through the mediation of this principle." Mediated knowing is the real enemy of religion founded on sensibility, and the religion of the sensual man is in opposition to discursive theology. Theology distinguishes the subject from man, and the ground of this distinction lies in the religious knowing, which is owned by God Himself, and which must be revealed before it is open to human cognizance. And Feuerbach asserts, in the style of the Enlightenment, that faith is superstition. The omnipotence of miracles is subsumed under modern subjectivity and further judged as the arbitrary and arbitrary power of man. In order to overcome so-called subjectivism, Feuerbach worked out a new philosophy of religion, which is no different from psychology or anthropology, and is anthropology itself.

　　The origin of the idea of religion is fully revealed in the class essence of man, which is conceived as an infinite interbeing. Faith in God is thus no other than man's faith in himself, and this self is the class essence. The religion advocated by Feuerbach is the faith of the social man. Feuerbach sees religion only as a religious worldview from a practical standpoint, which is prescribed by morality. "The theory of faith is a theory of obligation to God, and God is the supreme obligation of faith. The ...... obligation to God is in conflict with the obligation of the common man ......" Insofar as the discovery of the pathological element that God is in fact the common man is concerned, the opposition of the so-called obligation as a purely abstract thing of thought has lost its validity. In keeping with Feuerbach's critique of origins, Christian doctrine is reduced to its natural source, psychologically the basic need for love. Love for man is conceived as the moral goodness of God. Goodness, though not related to my conscience, is related to humanity. Without myself, conscience has become impossible; here humanity refers to the requirements of the complete human being, who as a natural essence is individually human and who needs others. In the religion of the worldview, the society of individuals takes the place of the state, the significance of the state is hollowed out, it is no longer the representative of the whole nation. Society represents the majority of others and plays the role of a moral God.

　　The Christian precept of love turns into a precept of suffering, and on the scale that "suffering for others is divine". Suffering is thus seen as the motive force of love and ultimately moves to the foreground as the first decider. Feuerbach emphasizes suffering and passivity as the principle of the world, which is in opposition to subjectivity, i.e. the principle of objectivity. Accordingly, his religious critique focuses on Christ as the personal God. Because the Son represents individuality and corporeality, and God's love originates in love for the Son, Feuerbach argues that the second Person of the Trinity should be the first. As the reality of God, Christ becomes the object of Feuerbach's unbounded sensuality - that is, imagination. "Christ is the God who is personally known, Christ is thus the certainty of supreme bliss, the certainty that God exists and exists just as the emotions want and demand." Suffering becomes an imagined luxury of enjoyment, and God appears in imagination in the image of Christ, whereas God is the class concept of mutual existence and Christ is the individual person, and thus the class is embodied in the individual. The reality of this experience lacks any worldly present; on the contrary, it denies the responsibility of the I acting in the world to the self. Death on the cross loses its historical prescriptiveness and is merely a psychologically argued consequence of the Christian worldview-which is: the suffering of human blood is used to vouch for survival. Jesus is thus understood merely as the Savior, and salvation is nothing but the miracle of the magician, who himself needs human suffering to flaunt himself. "The marvelous Savior is the miracle of realized emotion, unbound by moral law, ...... saved in an absolutely subjective, emotional way." So far, faith is just subjective good works or psychological miracles.

　　II. Class Awareness

　　Feuerbach explains faith as belief in miracles, that is, the freedom of imagination, and then goes on to put what he calls the rational freedom of sensibility in the place of religion and metaphysics. Consciousness is not the freedom of the abstract faculty, but on the contrary, it is based on the natural man. Thought is no longer a sign of human creativity, but only a "necessary consequence and characteristic of human nature". The nature of man is defective and impoverished as a restricted individual, and its perfection and positive action are expressed in the life of the class. The class, which is conceived as a free subject, has its corresponding here-and-now only in the totality of human nature, and therefore the class is also the supreme object of sensible reason. If man, because of his lack of worldview education, confuses imagination with reality and does not know the concept of class, then only the concept of God can replace class. Science should first bring the "uneducated subjective man" to intuition. Of course, as long as the first reality is the body for Feuerbach, the life of the class is based on gender differences. From this arises the loving fervor of Feuerbach's anthropology, which treats attitudes of interpersonal behavior as religious and, as a result, acquires an ethics based on bodily sex. In Feuerbach's words, "The basis of ethics is gender difference."

　　Feuerbach sees the history of Christianity as the history of the suffering of humanity, and this suffering results in "the immediate identity of the class and the individual in Christianity." Feuerbach sees here the sacrifice of the class for the sake of the individual, which is the end of the history of theology. Since the origin-critical philosophy does not see the humanization of God as the ground of human fraternity, but only considers the psychological effects of the body, this philosophy discovers the secret of the miracle: "It is the class that pours love into me. ...... The consciousness of Christ as Love is the class consciousness. ...... The consciousness of our oneness." On the contrary, the Christian revelation becomes a fact that has passed away in the history of time, into the existence of a God once believed in, which denies the existence of man. The elevation of the feeling of love to consciousness constitutes the essence of the new philosophy and its tolerance. Feuerbach argues that Christianity is also characterized by subjectivity, and that subjectivity in isolation from physicality is intolerant. Sensuous consciousness is combined in originology with sensation, which in the anthropological sense is the role of the body. Such consciousness is on the opposite side of its own certainty, and whereas Feuerbach accuses certainty of being only subjective certainty, sensuous consciousness speaks directly of the other side of spirit, which appears in the name of nature and is the material basis. Such a foundational conception overcomes subjectivity. By clinging to the immediacy of consciousness, the need for an intermediary disappears; the intermediary is nothing more than the object of theological reflection, an image of man alienated by objectification. The body, as subject and primordializer, can be sensed directly. It survives in time and space, always holding reality, though this reality is also lost in time and space.

　　"The body is the basis, the subject of personality." This inversion of the consciousness of modern philosophy at the same time obliterates the freedom of modern consciousness and its certainty of its own knowing, that is, the certainty of truth through reflective mediation. The basis emerges directly as a source, excluding any communication and mediation with itself. In contrast to the perceptual certainty of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the absolute immediacy of anthropology does not lead to any proof of itself. The foundation merely provides a guarantee for direct consciousness, but there is no argument for it. Both body and consciousness are understood only abstractly in a one-sidedness; they have no right to be compared with the recent concept of the subject, which concretizes itself in predicates. In Feuerbach's case, on the other hand, the body is liberated from theological knowing and presents the bodily person and all its dilemmas. Beneath the word "body" is a multitude of Others in the plural, whom Feuerbach names "you". "The Other is my you - ...... It is in the Other that I am conscious of humanity." The "I" loses any self-control brought about by certainty and is dispersed into the diversity of the Other, and the relationship between the many Others embodies the multitude of needs in the social form. I am first you; I bear the Other. Grasped for the passions, I become active, though this I immediately disintegrates back into an object of you or some other. The movement is from object to object, from you to you. Here there is no consciousness in the sense of a subject, although Feuerbach glorifies the Other in terms of the class: "The Other is the representative of the class, and even though he is a human being, he replaces my longing for a multitude of others. ......" Such a comment reveals the helplessness of the concept of the class. The class has no support, its reality must be constantly replaced, "the class realizes itself in an unlimited multitude of individuals of different types, where the infinity of the essence of the class is disclosed." The "representation of the class" is a reproduction, but this reproduction and the order of substitution of its objects cannot be tested by prior reflection, as in modern philosophy, and there is no point in talking about the homogeneity of the reproduction. What Feuerbach calls reality has the character of a false appearance, a substitute for reality.

　　The totality of the class expresses the majority of the individual. It survives as mutually separated individuals, though it has the formal unity of mutual existence. "There is only human truth in the truth of the majority." Feuerbach's view of unity as requiring that the class be sacrificed for the individual means for Feuerbach what he sees as the sin of subjectivity, specifically the exclusion of the majority from unity. He indicts the Trinity in this way, "The fact that personhood arises only in the relation of father and son means that the concept of personhood is here only a relative concept, a relational concept. ...... Through the relationship of father and son, man reduces himself to a relative, non-independent, non-human essence." In this way man is sacrificed for God. According to Feuerbach, the Trinity was originally "the sum total of essential distinctions in nature, distinctions which man feels in his human essence." As this essence is only formally interconnected, there can be no revelation of it in the sense of knowing. The class has no reality of its own, but only a sense of self felt in the difference of sexes. The fear of God disappears into a you-me relationship with God, and Feuerbach celebrated this personification of God as the true content and final advance of Christianity. The Trinity meant for him "the secret of a common social life - the secret of your necessity for me". Classes live in time as much as individual persons. Just as the existence of the class is dispersed over a multitude of persons, so the consciousness of the class is essentially connected with the consciousness of others and ultimately expresses itself as a necessity of identity. The demand for the emancipation of religion from discursive theology aims at the dissolution of the Trinitarian prescriptiveness of the revealed God, the abolition of God's knowledge itself, whereby the binding nature of truth is withdrawn into the opinion of the individual human being.

　　Participation in public opinion, which constitutes the only bond of man, that is, sociality. The person who is very different in his opinions is precisely not marked by particularity; on the contrary, he is unable to tolerate it. Feeling compelled by finitude, he communicates this distress to others. Here, human love is essentially sympathy between human beings, despite physical isolation, and man wants to mold a moral personality on the basis of psychological communion. For such a universal, Hegel's words to the people of civil society are equally valid: "Grinding down the particulars ...... is the manifestation of reasonableness," which is responsible for the fulfillment of various needs. Morality in this humanitarian sense rises in Feuerbach to the religion of the social man, which should constitute the antithesis of the "supernaturalistic egoism" of Christianity: "the emotion of sympathy, of participation, and therefore of a solid, real, discursive emotion. " Feuerbach sees in sympathy the disappearance of all differences, whether political, religious, or national. Such a here-and-now universality should banish the natural man's predicament, the kind of predicament that is tied to his natural dependence. To be liberated from nature and thus to be free means at the same time to abandon the natural man and the basis of his religion. The divinity of man ascends to the place of religion. "Man and man - the unity of I and thou - is God." This is the goal of Feuerbach's anthropology, a goal that should become the common consciousness of all society as a humanist imperative. But as long as the class stays in class consciousness, the divinity of man for this consciousness slips into the future as a belief on the other side of man's present historical reality. The goal becomes rigidly ideological and tied to the future, which is only an empty space of possibilities.

　　III. The Divine Nature of Society

　　God's existence as a human being became an icon of reality in bourgeois society and reduced the ancient God to an imaginary image. In the place of the universal demands of reason emerges the need for love - to share and sympathize with others, which is the sensual connection of society. Feuerbach distinguishes between imagined sensuality and sensual reality. The ancient God is only imagined as a subjective human pathology, whereas the class consciousness is engaged in the "truth of things, the primitive language" that is the basis of social understanding. The social person is conceived as the object that primitively understands the self and trusts and depends on each other. "Reason arises only where men speak to men, only in conversation, in common behavior. Questioning and answering are the primary actions of thought. Primitively they belong to the two persons of thought." The two are the language of sensibility turned into a body, and sensibility prescribes itself as the language of the Other. According to the passive principle of the new philosophy, the relation always comes from the Other, with the firstness of you as the starting point. "Only the predicative reality is the guarantee of existence", and Feuerbach's God thus becomes the "thing-self". This anthropological thing-self itself appears in the function of display as the you, an uncontrolled majority that consolidates its respective realities only through the mutual exclusion of space. Thus, the reality of the you expresses the mutual separation and indifference of existence. The idea represented by you never concerns everyone, but can only be divided into my opinion and his opinion, and the primitiveness of the opinion implies nothing else but a multitude of positions of mutual exclusion of the attitudes of the multitude, each of which is the other, coming into view as you.

　　Feuerbach's worldview is an economic system of spatial location differences. "The locational stipulation is the first rational stipulation," and here the rational stipulation falls entirely into the one-sidedness of externality. Against Hegel, Feuerbach emphasizes, "Where there is no spatial separation, there is no logic." His logic is purely external to necessity, dividing space and delimiting the sequence of time. "Here I am, there you are; we are separated; therefore we can be two persons, without damage to each other; there are enough positions." In these positions everyone is all he has. By the division of the positions one finally understands heartily the love of Feuerbach's religion, which expresses a possessive desire: "Two persons, difference is the source of religion - you are my God, and it is evident that without you I do not exist; I depend on you; without you - -without me." This love proceeds from the intolerable experience of the state of separation, the passion for objects which make one dream of the community of man and man which is mutual existence. The so-called natural dependence of man sees only the uses of nature, which is determined by the world of sensual man. Man, who is attached to the abstract sameness of man's mutual existence, thus seeks a solid support for the idea to which he clings in the conception of the foundation of nature, yet this abstract idea of community has no place outside of Feuerbach's system of the spatial world. Yet, "If you are nothing, you are nothing." This pain allows the foundational conceit to transgress the idea of all to become the mystery of nature, and pain is glorified in Feuerbach's consciousness, which transgresses the boundaries of cognition as a violence to reason and thus becomes fanaticism.

　　In contrast to the language of logical thought, Feuerbach highlights the ineffability of being. He argues that logical language as an intermediary act of reason has no basis for self-activity because it is devoid of passion. The foundation is pre-thought and therefore ineffable existence, which reveals its secrets only in the community of I and Thou created by sensibility. The essence of man takes on a verbal meaning - to show the secrets of existence. "It is where words stop that life begins and the secret of existence opens itself. ...... Existence has a self-made meaning and rationality even if it has no verbalizability." The rationality of existence is sensibility, speaking on impulse for what you inspire. "Language ...... is nothing else but the realization of the class, the communication between me and you in order to express the unity of the class by abandoning the isolation of the individual of the class." The means of expression are the image and the imagination belonging to the image. Both are recreated; they originate in the body and its passions. For Feuerbach, thought speaks only in images. Thought expresses only the need for love, and in keeping with the need for love, the image is the idol, which fulfills the need for love in the imagination and makes desire into self-enjoyment. "Where the consciousness of the class itself arose, Jesus disappeared, and his true nature was not lost; for he had been the agent of the consciousness of the class." This subversion of the nature of language seeks to separate sensibility from reason altogether, thus objectifying both for manipulation at will. Thus, language is given revolutionary power as the common action of classes, and language masters human nature.

　　"Speaking is free action; the word itself is free." Art and religion were once the forms of the Absolute's knowing, the essential components of Absolute Science. And here speaking and speech are separated from art and religion as forms of absolute knowing from their source. On the contrary, Feuerbach declares, "Only polytheism, so-called idolatry, is the origin of art and science." Consciousness becomes blood and flesh before it emerges in the sensuous community. This led Feuerbach to dream of a new kind of poetry and art, yet hitherto novel art in the sense of a higher and superior reproduction remained neither recognizable nor therefore realized as an intention. Yet, with the new interpretation, the ancient God and the art closely associated with his knowing became unworthy of belief. Instead of establishing a new form of knowing, the mass distorts the universality of the spirit. Such an abuse of the knowledge of history is the real cause of nihilism. Nihilism became the theme of Nietzsche, and Nietzsche used it as a kind of bump; the crisis of history drove him to create a new faith, but he was not able to break the illusion of historical continuity in his historical investigations. As philosophy is reduced to a worldview that has lost its spirit, so religion and art are inevitably hollowed out as ideologies and their idolatry. Ideology is a superstructure built on hope, which conceals the non-truth of reality and does not want to grasp it, but to experience it. The so-called aesthetic intuition that the intelligentsia espouses produces not the artist but the playwright who creates fantasies, and whose deception is entirely conscious because he scenes and stages the ideology and disguises himself in order to be recognized by the audience. Countless idols are created as "you", but there is no real human self. Manipulation shows the charm of freedom, but this illusion is limited to the extent that it serves the self-preserving impulses of society. For Feuerbach, however, the impulse of self-preservation is precisely the principle of morality. The language of the playwright represents the opinion of the masses, and only in this way does he gain an audience. Therefore, he must constantly replace the "you" in order to satisfy the masses.

　　After the withdrawal of the sense of self-cultivation from science, science also becomes instrumental, i.e., it serves the manipulation of objects and is also effective in the control of man. Man only still searches for himself in the class without myself. His facsimile is no longer God, but man in his own kind, in a society of companions. The sameness of man is no longer in the sense of personality, but is understood as an expression of the same life of the majority. The latter is the basic idea of society. This is expressed above all in the language of man, which is the propaganda instrument of social consciousness. "Language is the measure of how high or low the standard of human education is." The modern upbringing of natural reason constitutes science through reflection, which is objectification within strict rules of method. Unlike the upbringing of natural reason, the sensible man treats science itself as if it were something directly existing, so that, in contrast to the negativity shown by the history of natural consciousness, science is called positive empirical science. After many reversals, reason itself sheds itself on externalized thought and returns to what is called the source of thought, that is, man and his kind. Such a return to the source is, in Feuerbach's view, the task of scientific education, which should be guided by the experience of science, which is an "objective perceptual intuition without counterfeiting". According to Feuerbach, "education is dependent on the outside and has certain needs". From the standpoint of absolute immediacy, both language and education lose the mediating position in which they were once recognized as forms of knowing. Feuerbach establishes the relation to the natural basis as the only sign of truth. In place of the self-cultivation of natural consciousness is the education of the sensible man, and what is called education is simply the appropriation of all that is readily available, especially the results of research in the natural and social sciences. These researches can contribute to the popularization of the perceptual worldview and infinitely expand its horizons. Infinity in the sense of having no boundaries, the infinity of the future is taken as the progress of human nature, in the prospect of a society in which there is no dominant man, but only God, who originates from the "I and Thou".

　　Cite the version:

　　The Complete Works of Feuerbach (abbreviated FGW), Academy Press, Berlin 1982

Feuerbach, Gesammelte Werke, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1982.

　　The Complete Works of Hegel, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1980.

Hegel, Gesammelte Werke，Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1980.

　　Lectures, 14 volumes, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2000

Lectures, Volume 14, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2000.

　　The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Historical Examiner Edition (abbreviated KGW), publisher Colley, Montanari

Nietzsche Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGW), edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari.

　　Feng-Gag, M, Feuerbach, Philosophy and Critique of Religion, New Philosophy, Munich 1970

von Gagern, Michael, Ludwig Feuerbach, Critique of Philosophy and Religion,

The New Philosophy", Munich 1970.

　　Schaal, C-A, Nietzsche's Labyrinth: The Primal Mind and Soul, Alber Verlag, Freiburg/Munich 1985

Scheier, Claus-Arthur, Nietzsche's Labyrinth: Original Thought and the Soul, Alber, Freiburg, Munich 1985.

　　Excerpted from From Humanitarian Worldview to Modern Introspection on the World - Feuerbach, Marx and Nietzsche, Nanjing University Press 2006.

　　An analysis of the sense in which Feuerbach's materialism is an old materialism

　　Feuerbach's materialism is one of the important ideological sources of Marxist philosophy. However, in the study of Marxist philosophy and the history of Marxist philosophy, Feuerbach has been criticized as a typical representative of old materialism. What kind of old materialism is Feuerbach's materialism? Clarifying this question is of great significance for the correct evaluation of Feuerbach and the study of Marxist philosophy.

　　"one" radical in Chinese characters (Kangxi radical 1)

　　Among the Young Hegelians, Feuerbach took the lead in criticizing Hegel's discursive philosophy, put an end to the long reign of idealism in Germany, and "bluntly restored materialism to its throne" (Marx and Engels, vol. 4, p. 222) and "in his first resolute attack on Hegel he confronted drunken discursiveness with sober philosophy". Hegel with sober philosophy against drunken discourse" (Marx and Engels, vol. 4, p. 222), and "in his first resolute attack on Hegel, with sober philosophy against drunken discourse". (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, vol. 2, p. 159) Feuerbach opposed Hegel's taking the absolute idea as the starting point of philosophy, while the actual existence became secondary; he exposed that "in Hegel's case, the totality and absoluteness of a phenomenon or existence, such as f, is treated as an object, and therefore the various stages of development, which are independent of each other, are only of secondary significance, but only as some shadows". and only continue to exist as some shadow, some link, some drop of poison against poison, in the stage of the pole." (Selected Philosophical Writings of S. Bach, vol. 1, p. 47) In Feuerbach's view, although Hegel also advocates the unity of subject and object, spirit and nature, the nature he refers to only has the meaning of the object, i.e., the meaning set up for the subject, but not the existence of the real. Contrary to Hegel, he thinks: "The reality of sensible, individual existence is, for us, a truth guaranteed by the stamp of our freshness." (Ibid., p. 68.)

　　stupid (Beijing dialect)

　　It is generally believed that Feuerbachian materialism, because of its metaphysical nature, should be categorized as old materialism. This understanding is based on two aspects: the first is the relevant discussion of Engels. Engels had attributed Feuerbach's materialism to the materialism of 18th century France. Since Feuerbach failed to accomplish the task of "harmonizing and transforming the science of society, that is, the sum of the so-called historical and philosophical sciences, with the foundations of materialism", "although he had the foundations of materialism, he had not yet freed himself from the traditional fetters of idealism". Although he had a materialist foundation, he had not yet escaped from the traditional fetters of idealism here" (Marx and Engels, vol. 4, pp. 226-227), and "as soon as we come into contact with Feuerbach's philosophy of religion and ethics, his true idealism is revealed" (ibid., p. 229). Feuerbach, like the French materialist philosophers, "stayed halfway, he was a materialist in the lower part and an idealist in the upper part" (ibid., p. 241). 18th-century French materialism has "a second peculiar limitation: it is unable to understand the world as a process, as a world in the midst of a process, as a world in the midst of a process, as a world in the midst of a process, as a world in the midst of a process, as a world in the midst of a process, as a world in the midst of a process. The second characteristic limitation of 18th century French materialism was that it could not understand the world as a process, as a substance in constant historical development.

　　surname San

　　In the Syllabus on Feuerbach, Marx clearly pointed out that "the main shortcoming of all previous materialisms (including Feuerbach's materialism) is that objects, reality, and sensibility are understood only in terms of object or intuitive forms, not as sensible human activities, not as practices, not in terms of the subject. " (Marx and Engels, Selected Works, vol. 1, p. 54) Since the old materialism excluded practice from the relation between man and the sensible world of man, in solving the relation between thought and existence, existence, the sensible world, could only be regarded as an object of intuition, not as an object of practical activity.

　　The view of practice is the first and fundamental view of the new materialism, which "always stands on the basis of the history of reality, and explains practice not in terms of ideas, but in terms of material practice in terms of what is conceptualized." (Marx and Engels, Selected Works, vol. 1, p. 73) Marx called Feuerbach's materialism "intuitive materialism," "i.e., materialism that does not understand sensibility as practical activity." (ibid., p. 56) The intuitive nature of Feuerbach's materialism is the fundamental reason why it is the old materialism.

　　Feuerbach's famous story of living in the middle of nowhere rather than bending the knee.

　　In 1828, Feuerbach graduated from the University of Berlin and became a lecturer at the University of Irving, where he anonymously published his essay "On Death and Immortality" in 1830. This article against Christianity was published, it caused a strong social reaction; the progressive educated people applauded, the Christian Church was horrified, the German reactionary authorities were furious, and immediately banned the article, traced the author's real name, and when it was learned that the author of the article was the Irish Roots University lecturer Feuerbach, Feuerbach was immediately and roughly driven out of the door of the school. Feuerbach was not discouraged by this, he continued to study hard and engaged in writing, from the standpoint of materialism, criticizing religious theology and Hegel's idealistic philosophy which dominated the thought world at that time, published "The Nature of Christianity", "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy", "The Nature of Religion" and other writings and many essays, restored the authority of materialism, and won a very high social reputation, many university professors and students hoped to see the author of this article. Many university professors and students wanted him to return to teach at the university. However, the reactionary authorities ignored all this and stubbornly refused to allow Feuerbach to return to the university lectures.

　　Feuerbach was well aware of the dastardly aims of the reactionary German authorities, and he told the good people that the solution of his "lecturing problem could only be realized at the price of political servility and religious ignorance," and that he himself was determined to- Moral and Educational Tales of Famous Men and Women

　　He would not abandon his anti-religious position and "bow down" to the reactionary authorities in order to return to the university pulpit. In order to be faithful to his own beliefs, Feuerbach gave up the idea of re-entering the university to publicize his philosophical ideas, and in 1837 he moved to the village of Bruchberg in the state of Saurinia. There, he lived in solitude for twenty-five years, practicing his determination not to bend the knee to the Christian Church and the reactionary authorities of Germany by his action of willingly living in a poor countryside, and showing his valor.

费尔巴哈的提纲心得体会 篇2

　　一、关于《提纲》

　　《提纲》写于1845年春，最早发表于1888年。对于这个《提纲》，恩格斯给予了高度地评价，认为这是一份“非常宝贵的”、“包含着新世界观的天才萌芽的第一个文件”，是“历史唯物主义的起源”。（《马克思恩格斯全集》第39卷，第24、25页）在《提纲》中，新世界观的天才萌芽究竟表现在什么地方呢？在这个《提纲》中心世界观的天才萌芽就表现在他十分强调实践的作用上。实践问题，就好是一条主线一样自始至终地贯穿在整个《提纲》的每一条中。在这里，马克思非常强调实践在人们认识中的作用、在社会生活和社会发展中的作用，并且强调指出用革命的实践去改造世界，这是马克思主义哲学和以前一切哲学的根本区别之点。由于马克思十分强调实践的作用，并把人的活动了解为实践活动，把人看作是能够改造世界的实践的动物，这就为以后系统的制定辩证唯物主义、历史唯物主义和科学社会主义的原理奠定了基础。因此，强调实践的作用是马克思主义哲学领域中所做革命变革的一个非常重要的方面。

　　就内容而讲，整篇文章可以分为四大部分：

　　一、揭露一切唯心主义和旧唯物主义的根本缺陷。

　　唯心论先验论看到了主体的能动性，但夸大了能动性

　　旧唯物论承认认识是对客观存在的反映，但否认了主体的能动性

　　二、以实践为基础，把辩证法与唯物主义反映论统一起来，创立了能动的反映论，点明新唯物主义的特点：实践的能动性。

　　辩证唯物论能动反映论认为认识是主体在实践中对客体的能动反映。

　　1、对实践作了科学规定——人类感性、能动、批判的活动。

　　2、提出实践是认识的基础——实践把主体和客体相联系，实践中主体和客体构成双向关系，表现为：

　　人化自然（客体主体化）：主体把自身的目的、愿望赋予客体，创造出自然界原本不存在的东西。

　　自然人化（主体客体化）：主体吸收了客体的本质、属性，转化为自身的能力。

　　3、实践是检验真理的唯一标准：

　　真理是主观对客观的正确反映，检验真理的标准必须把主客观相联系。

　　实践是主观指导下对客观存在的改造，实践把主客观相联系。

　　三、以实践为基础，把辩证唯物论与历史唯物论相结合，对旧唯物主义的各种错误进行一一的解剖和批判。

　　1、对人的本质作了科学概括

　　人的本质是后天形成的

　　人的本质是一切社会关系的总和

　　2、社会生活本质上是实践的

　　劳动实践是人和社会产生的决定性环节

　　社会生活的最终根源在于实践

　　3、思维、理论的世界根源于现实的世界

　　四、在指出新旧唯物主义立足点的不同的基础上，把认识世界与改造世界相统一。

　　1、过去的哲学停留于“解释世界”，而不在力于“改造世界”。

　　2、马克思主义哲学强调认识世界的目的在于改造世界。

　　（1）、一种理论作用的发挥只能通过人们的实践活动表现出来。

　　（2）、一种理论作用发挥的程度在于人们实践活动中被接受的程度。

　　（3）、正确的理论最终会被大多数人接受，也才会在思想史上留下它的地位，成为人类社会精神文明的组成部分。

　　二、心的评论

　　《提纲》的重大意义，首先在于它确立了科学的实践观，从而为唯物史观和马克思主义哲学提供了生长点和立足点。实践的观点是唯物史观最基本的、首要的观点。正是基于科学的实践观点，马克思在《提纲》中深刻地揭示了社会生活的实践本质，科学地说明了人的社会性本质，正确地阐述了社会实践是历史发展的动力。也正是在科学实践观的基础上，马克思正确地解决了历史观的基本问题，进而阐明了实践在认识论中的基础地位和决定性意义。

　　《提纲》提出的科学实践观，从根本上揭露了从前一切唯物主义，包括费尔巴哈唯物主义在内的根本缺陷。马克思提出，旧唯物主义由于不理解实践的意义，因而不能正确地解决主体和客体的关系，更看不到主体基于实践基础上的能动性，因而在本质上是一种消极、直观的唯物主义。

　　三、总结

　　在对《提纲》进行了解读后，我们可以总结，马克思的唯物主义史观相对于唯心主义史观和直观唯物主义史观有以下的特点：

　　第一，主观性与客观性的统一。实践是人类能动地改造和探索现实世界的社会性的客观物质活动，是主观作用于客观环境的感性活动，体现了主观性和客观性的辩证统一。实践是联系主体和客体、沟通主观和客观的桥梁和纽带，具有了主观性和客观性的特征。实践的基本特点在于它走出了意识活动的范围，指向了主观领域之外的客观世界，成为一种能够使外部对象发生某种改变的现实的物质活动。然而，实践自身的主观性与客观性的矛盾对立并不是僵死的、抽象的对立，而是相互作用、相互规定，从而克服各自的片面性。在实践中，一方面人的感性世界绝不是某种开天辟地以来就已存在的、始终如一的东西，而是世世代代活动的结果。同样，实践也在不断扬弃人的主观性，把主观性、目的和理想付诸现实，使超感性的东西感性化。人正是通过这种自身所特有的感性活动把观念转化为直接现实性的存在，使自己的思维对象化。主观世界以及主观世界和客观世界的关系形成于人的实践活动中。实践本身就是主观作用于客观的活动，并使主观和客观真正意义上达到了统一。

　　第二，个体性与社会性的统一。人在实践中，相对于客体来讲处于主体地位，实践的发动与运行，以及所产生的结果，都是从实践主体的利益和需要联系在一起的。人通过实践能够认识客观对象的本质和规律。而且能够利用规律使物按人的要求同人发生一些关系达到物被人所掌握和占有的目的。实践的自主性确立了人对自然界的主体地位。而人的本质是“一切社会关系的总和”，因此，人的实践活动，实际上也是个体与社会统一的过程。

　　第三，能动性和受动性的统一。实践活动最大特点是具有能动性、创造性，这说明人的实践不是简单地适应自然，也不是简单地复制自然，而是对自然的积极改造。但同时人的实践活动也受自然规律的制约。实践活动使得客体主体化，使得人在实践过程中日益把非人的纯自然物质力量越来越多地转化为人所驾驭支配的属人的物质力量。随着实践的发展，主客体矛盾和主客观矛盾关系也在变化发展，新的事物、新的规律涌现出来，成为人的新的制约力量，由此也使人的受动性得以改变和扩大。人只有认识自然规律和社会规律，按客观规律办事，才能获得驾驭并改造世界的自由，实现人的能动性，实现人的本质和价值。

　　第四，科学性和价值性的辩证统一。实践的受动性要求实践具有科学性，实践的科学性就是实践合乎规律。人们要成功地实践，必须以自身所面对的世界为前提和基础，正确地认识它存在及其运动、变化发展的本质和规律。人的活动从本质上看是一种创造性的活动，但人的创造并不是无中生有，也不能随心所欲。人类的伟大在于能自觉和全面地认识和掌握事物的本质和规律，为自己的利益服务。人类对客观世界的探索、认识和理性掌握的程度越深，范围越广，人类自身的本质力量就愈益得到提升和增强。人类的实践活动越符合自然规律，就越具科学性，也就越能获得更大的成功。实践价值性也在于实践的“目的性”。人们探索和认识世界，追求真理，不是为了解释世界，而在于改变世界。任何实践都是出于人们的需要和利益实现要求，实践的价值性就在于实践能否达到预定的目的。实践活动中既要遵循科学性，又要追求价值性，并在这一过程中实现了自身的“意志和意识”，把世界变成了人类所理想的现实。在实践活动过程中，人们既通过主体客体化过程创造出主体所需要的价值世界，又通过客体主体化、人性化的过程，创造了主体自身的价值需求，实现了创造活动自身的价值。人是价值的创造者，人只有在创造性的劳动中，才能显示自己的能力，才能实现自己的人生价值。

　　参考文献：

　　1、马克思、恩格斯：《马克思恩格斯选集》第1卷，人民出版社1972年版

　　2、马方来：《论科学实践观》，黑龙江大学马克思主义理论与思想政治教育专业20xx年硕士毕业论文

　　3、尤作欣：《试论马克思哲学新视界中社会关系》，云南师范大学马克思主义理论与思想政治教育专业20xx年硕士毕业论文

Feuerbach's syllabus experience Part 2

　　I. On the Outline

　　The Syllabus was written in the spring of 1845 and first published in 1888. Engels spoke highly of the Syllabus as a "very valuable" document "containing the first germ of the genius of a new world view" and "the origin of historical materialism". " (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 39, pp. 24, 25) What exactly is the germ of the genius of the new worldview expressed in the Syllabus? The genius of the worldview at the center of this Syllabus is expressed in his great emphasis on the role of practice. The question of practice runs through every article of the Syllabus from beginning to end as if it were a main thread. Here, Marx emphasized the role of practice in people's understanding, in social life and social development, and stressed the use of revolutionary practice to transform the world, which is the fundamental difference between Marxist philosophy and all previous philosophies. Since Marx placed great emphasis on the role of practice and understood human activities as practical activities and regarded human beings as practical animals capable of transforming the world, this laid the foundation for the later systematic formulation of the principles of dialectical materialism, historical materialism and scientific socialism. The emphasis on the role of practice was thus a very important aspect of the revolutionary changes made in the field of Marxist philosophy.

　　As far as the content is concerned, the whole article can be divided into four main parts:

　　I. Expose the fundamental flaws of all idealism and old materialism.

　　The idealistic a priori sees the subject's agency, but exaggerates it

　　The old materialism recognized cognition as a reflection of objective existence, but denied the subject's agency

　　Second, based on practice, the dialectic was unified with the materialist theory of reflection, creating a dynamic theory of reflection, pointing out the characteristics of the new materialism: the dynamic nature of practice.

　　Dialectical materialism's theory of dynamic reflection holds that cognition is the subject's dynamic reflection of the object in practice.

　　1. A scientific regulation of practice - human sensual, dynamic, critical activity.

　　2. Proposes that practice is the basis of knowledge - practice connects the subject and the object, and in practice the subject and the object constitute a two-way relationship that manifests itself:

　　Anthropomorphizing nature (object subjectification): the subject gives its own purposes and desires to the object, creating something that did not originally exist in nature.

　　Naturalization (objectification of the subject): the subject absorbs the essence and attributes of the object and transforms them into its own capabilities.

　　3. Practice is the only criterion for testing the truth:

　　Truth is the correct reflection of subjectivity to objectivity, and the test of truth must link subjectivity to objectivity.

　　Practice is the subjectively guided transformation of objective existence, and practice connects subject and object.

　　Third, based on practice, combining dialectical materialism with historical materialism, dissecting and criticizing the various errors of the old materialism one by one.

　　1. Scientific generalization of the nature of the human being

　　The nature of man is acquired

　　The essence of man is the sum of all social relations

　　2. Social life is essentially practical

　　The practice of labor is a decisive link in the emergence of man and society

　　The ultimate roots of social life lie in practice

　　3. The world of thought and theory is rooted in the world of reality

　　Fourth, on the basis of pointing out the difference between the old and the new materialism's footholds, it unifies the understanding of the world with the transformation of the world.

　　1. The philosophy of the past was stuck in "explaining the world" rather than in "transforming the world".

　　2. Marxist philosophy emphasizes that the purpose of knowing the world is to transform it.

　　(1) The role of a theory can only be manifested through people's practical activities.

　　(2) The extent to which a theory is useful lies in the extent to which it is accepted in people's practical activities.

　　(3) The correct theory will eventually be accepted by the majority of people, and only then will it leave its place in the history of ideas and become an integral part of the spiritual civilization of human society.

　　II. Comments from the heart

　　The significance of the Outline lies, first of all, in the fact that it establishes a scientific view of practice, thus providing a growing point and a foothold for the materialist concept of history and Marxist philosophy. The view of practice is the most basic and primary view of materialistic history. It is on the basis of the scientific view of practice that Marx profoundly reveals the practical nature of social life in the Syllabus, scientifically explains the nature of man's social nature, and correctly expounds that social practice is the driving force of historical development. It is also on the basis of the scientific view of practice that Marx correctly solved the basic problem of the view of history, and then clarified the fundamental position and decisive significance of practice in epistemology.

　　The scientific concept of practice put forward in the Syllabus fundamentally exposes the fundamental flaws of all previous materialisms, including Feuerbachian materialism. Marx suggested that the old materialism was essentially a negative, intuitive materialism because it did not understand the significance of practice, and thus could not correctly resolve the relationship between subject and object, let alone see the subject's activity on the basis of practice.

　　III. Summary

　　Having interpreted the Syllabus, we can summarize that Marx's materialist view of history has the following characteristics in relation to the idealist and intuitive materialist views of history:

　　First, the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. Practice is a social, objective and material activity in which human beings are motivated to transform and explore the real world, and it is a perceptual activity in which the subjective acts on the objective environment, reflecting the dialectical unity of subjectivity and objectivity. Practice is the bridge and link between subject and object, between subjectivity and objectivity, and is characterized by subjectivity and objectivity. The basic characteristic of practice is that it goes out of the scope of conscious activity and points to the objective world outside the subjective sphere, becoming a kind of realistic material activity capable of bringing about some kind of change in external objects. However, the contradictory opposition between the subjectivity and objectivity of practice itself is not a rigid, abstract opposition, but one that interacts and regulates each other so as to overcome the one-sidedness of each. In practice, on the one hand, the perceptual world of man is by no means something that has existed consistently since the beginning of time, but is the result of generations of activity. In the same way, practice constantly renounces man's subjectivity, puts subjectivity, aims and ideals into reality, and sensualizes the supersensible. It is through this sensual activity, which is peculiar to himself, that man transforms ideas into immediate realities and objectifies his thinking. The subjective world and the relationship between the subjective and objective worlds are formed in man's practical activity. Practice itself is an activity in which the subjective acts on the objective and unites the subjective and the objective in the true sense of the word.

　　Second, the unity of individuality and sociality. In practice, human beings are in the position of subjects in relation to objects, and the initiation and operation of practice, as well as the results produced, are linked to the interests and needs of the subjects of practice. Through practice, people can recognize the nature and laws of objective objects. And can make use of the law to make the object according to the requirements of human beings to have some relations with people to achieve the purpose of the object to be mastered and possessed by human beings. The autonomy of practice establishes the subjective position of man in the natural world. And the nature of man is "the sum of all social relations", therefore, man's practical activities, in fact, is also the process of individual and social unity.

　　Thirdly, the unity of the dynamic and the reactive. The greatest characteristic of practical activity is that it is dynamic and creative, which means that human practice is not simply adapting to nature or reproducing it, but is an active transformation of nature. But at the same time, man's practical activity is also subject to the laws of nature. Practical activity makes the object subjectified, so that people in the process of practice increasingly non-human purely natural material power more and more into the human mastery of the domination of the material force belonging to the human being. With the development of practice, the subject-object contradiction and the subject-object-object contradiction relationship are also changing and developing, new things, new laws emerge, become the new constraints on human power, which also makes the human passivity can be changed and expanded. Only by recognizing the laws of nature and society and acting in accordance with the objective laws can human beings gain the freedom to master and transform the world, realize human mobility, and realize the essence and value of human beings.

　　Fourthly, the dialectical unity of scientificity and value. The dynamic nature of practice requires that it be scientific, and the scientific nature of practice means that it is in accordance with the law. In order to practice successfully, people must take the world they are facing as a prerequisite and foundation, and correctly recognize the essence and laws of its existence, its movement and its change and development. Human activity is by nature a creative activity, but human creation does not come from nothing, nor can it be done at will. The greatness of human beings lies in their ability to consciously and comprehensively recognize and grasp the nature and laws of things for their own benefit. The deeper and wider the degree and scope of man's exploration, knowledge and rational mastery of the objective world, the more the power of man's own nature will be upgraded and strengthened. The more the practical activities of human beings conform to the laws of nature, the more scientific they are, and the more successful they will be. The value of practice also lies in the "purposefulness" of practice. People explore and understand the world, the pursuit of truth, not to explain the world, but to change the world. Any practice is out of people's needs and interests to realize the requirements of the value of practice lies in the practice can achieve the intended purpose. Practical activities should not only follow the science, but also pursue the value, and in the process realize their own "will and consciousness", and turn the world into the ideal reality of human beings. In the process of practical activities, people not only through the process of objectification of the subject to create the value of the world that the subject needs, but also through the subjectification of the object, the process of humanization, the creation of the subject's own value needs, the realization of the creation of their own value of the activity. People are the creators of value, and only in creative labor can they show their abilities and realize the value of their lives.

　　References:

　　1. Marx and Engels: Selected Works of Marx and Engels, vol. 1, People's Publishing House, 1972 edition

　　2. Ma Fanglai, "On the Scientific View of Practice," 20xx Master's Thesis, Heilongjiang University, majoring in Marxist Theory and Ideological and Political Education

　　3. You Zuoxin, "Trying to Discuss the Social Relationships in the New Vision of Marx's Philosophy", Master's Thesis, Yunnan Normal University, 20xx, majoring in Marxist Theory and Ideological and Political Education.

费尔巴哈的提纲心得体会 篇3

　　摘要：

　　1845年，马克思在布鲁塞尔写下了精短的《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》。在这个被恩格斯喻为“包含着新世界观的天才萌芽的第一个文件”中马克思第一次以崭新的姿态提示了革命实践在认识世界和改造世界种的决定作用，阐明了以科学的实践观为基础的马克思主义哲学的基本观点，标志着马克思主义的辩证唯物主义由此而初步创立，一种崭新的哲学体系在科学实践观的基础上建立了起来。从而实现了哲学史上的又一次哲学革命。对哲学乃至全人类的所有都产生了划时代的作用。

　　关键词：

　　实践 直观唯物主义 实践唯物主义

　　马克思《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》（以下简称《提纲》）的出现绝非偶然，它是时代的产物，是马克思哲学理论活动的结晶。费尔巴哈突破了黑格尔的哲学体系，回复了唯物主义的权威，但费尔巴哈的人本学唯物主义仍然存在着形而上学性和不彻底性的缺陷。马克思从无产阶级的斗阵出发，依据哲学发展的必然逻辑，对德国古典哲学进行了分析和批判。《提纲》正是马克思批判德国古典哲学特别是费尔巴哈的哲学一个重要理论成果，也是马克思亲身实践的结晶。《提纲》对实践的强调就是对实践体验的理论回应。

　　费尔巴哈的唯物主义抛弃了德国古典哲学的唯心主义，特别是抛弃了黑格尔唯心主义哲学，但同时也抛弃了黑格尔的辩证法，费尔巴哈承认自然界离开意识而独立存在，意识是人脑的产物，空间、时间和机械运动是物质的存在形式；人是自然的产物，是思维和存在的统一体。他肯定了世界可知性，坚持认识论上的反应论，但他把人看是一种脱离历史和社会关系而存在的生物，并唯心主义的解释社会现象，着就使费尔巴哈的唯物主义成为“半截子的唯物主义”。

　　《提纲》是马克思主义哲学革命的重要标志。在《提纲》中，马克思恩格斯既分析批判了黑格尔唯心主义体系，又吸取了费尔巴哈的唯物主义基本内核，将唯物主义和辩证法结合起来，并从唯物主义立场出发，运用辩证法深刻分析和揭示了社会发展的内在矛盾，发现了唯物史观，从而创立了辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义。

　　《提纲》对于哲学的革命表现在许多方面，但是有一个根本的基点是其核心，既实践的.观点。马克思在草拟这份提纲时，已远远超出了费尔巴哈直观唯物主义片面性的观点，明确地提出了新哲学最根本观点，即革命的实践的观点。在这一观点的统帅下，马克思主义阐明了三个重要的问题：

　　一是“实践”本身的哲学阐明;

　　二是在实践的基础上，从唯物主义视角来分析社会历史的发展；

　　三是从实践的角度出发来解释人的本质。

　　另外，《提纲》指出了新旧唯物主义的根本区别及其社会基础。指出了旧唯物主义的三大缺陷：

　　一是旧唯物主义和辩证法脱节，和形而上学结合在一起，从而具有了形而上学性；

　　二是旧唯物主义的认识论是消极被动的反应论，不了解实践在认识中的地位和作用，不懂得实践是认识的前提和基础；

　　三是旧唯物主义历史观上是唯心主义的，由于它的不彻底性，从而不能吧唯物主义基本原理贯彻到社会领域中去，从而而只是由社会意识去说明社会存在和发展。

　　总之，《提纲》在马克思主义哲学的形成过程中具有重要的地位。它的中心思想就是阐明了实践在认识世界和改造世界中的决定性作用，确立了科学的实践观在哲学中的核心地位，标志着马克思主义哲学同旧哲学决裂，由此一种崭新的哲学体系在科学实践观上建立起来。当然，这种认识定格在一定的时空、一定的认识基础条件上，我们不能因此而否定费尔巴哈在哲学上，特别是在批判黑格尔唯心主义哲学，从构唯物主义哲学上的突出贡献。况且，马克思哲学成果是建立在费尔巴哈哲学的基础之上，之上在某种程度上发展了费尔巴哈的唯物主义哲学；从某种角度、某种程度上说没有费尔巴哈也就没有马克思主义哲学。

　　今天我们解读《提纲》，对当前正在进行的社会主义现代化建设无疑有重大的指导意义。社会主义在本质上是一种创新的事业，实践创新就是社会主义的生命所在。要在马克思主义科学实践观的指导下，引导人们科学地进行实践创新，既要坚持马克思主义的科学原理指导和社会主义改革和建设的实践，又要总结经验教训，将在改革探索中取得的感性认识上升到理性认识，在回到实践中经受检验和用于指导实践，解决好首创性实践无经验教训可学习借鉴的问题，纠正各种错误的倾向，不但提高实践的可行性和效益性。不管我们面临的情况一多复杂，困难有多大，只要我们能正确处理主观和客观，理论与实践的关系，立足于群众的科学实践，坚持一切从实际出发，实事求是，我们的事业就一定能成功。

Feuerbach's syllabus experience Part 3

　　Abstracts:

　　In 1845, in Brussels, Marx wrote his short Syllabus on Feuerbach. In this document, which Engels described as "the first document containing the germ of the genius of a new worldview," Marx for the first time hinted at the decisive role of revolutionary practice in understanding the world and transforming the world in a brand-new manner, and elucidated the basic ideas of Marxist philosophy based on the scientific concept of practice, marking the initial founding of Marxist dialectical materialism, and a brand-new philosophical system based on the scientific concept of practice. Dialectical materialism was thus initially founded, and a new philosophical system was established on the basis of the scientific concept of practice. Thus another philosophical revolution in the history of philosophy was realized. It has had an epoch-making effect on philosophy and even on all of mankind.

　　Keywords:

　　Practice Intuitive materialism Practical materialism

　　The appearance of Marx's Syllabus on Feuerbach (hereinafter referred to as the Syllabus) is no accident; it is a product of the times and the crystallization of Marx's philosophical and theoretical activities. Feuerbach broke through Hegel's philosophical system and reverted to the authority of materialism, but Feuerbach's anthroposophical materialism was still flawed by metaphysical and incomplete nature. Marx analyzed and criticized the German classical philosophy from the proletariat's bucket, based on the inevitable logic of philosophical development. The Syllabus is precisely an important theoretical result of Marx's critique of classical German philosophy, especially that of Feuerbach, and is also the crystallization of Marx's personal practice. The emphasis on practice in the Outline is a theoretical response to practical experience.

　　Feuerbach's materialism abandons the idealism of classical German philosophy, especially Hegelian idealism, but also abandons Hegel's dialectic. Feuerbach recognizes that nature exists independently of consciousness, that consciousness is a product of the human brain, and that space, time, and mechanical motion are forms of existence of matter; that human beings are a product of nature, and that they are a unity of thought and existence. He affirmed the intelligibility of the world and insisted on the epistemological theory of reaction, but he regarded human beings as a kind of creatures that existed apart from history and social relations, and idealistically explained social phenomena, which made Feuerbach's materialism become "half materialism".

　　The Syllabus is an important symbol of the Marxist philosophical revolution. In the Syllabus, Marx and Engels both analyzed and criticized the Hegelian system of idealism and absorbed the basic kernel of materialism of Feuerbach, combined materialism and dialectics, and, from the standpoint of materialism, used dialectics to profoundly analyze and reveal the inherent contradictions in the development of society, discovering the concept of materialist history and thus founding dialectical materialism and historical materialism.

　　The Syllabus revolutionizes philosophy in many ways, but there is a fundamental base that lies at its heart, both the practical ... point of view. In drafting this syllabus, Marx had gone far beyond the one-sided view of Feuerbach's intuitive materialism, and had clearly set forth the most fundamental view of the new philosophy, namely, the view of revolutionary practice. Under the umbrella of this view, Marxism elucidates three important issues:

　　First, the philosophical clarification of "practice" itself.

　　The second is to analyze the development of social history from a materialist perspective on the basis of practice;

　　Thirdly, the nature of man is explained from the point of view of practice.

　　In addition, the Syllabus points out the fundamental difference between old and new materialism and its social basis. The three major defects of the old materialism are pointed out:

　　One is that the old materialism was disconnected from dialectics and combined with metaphysics, thus taking on a metaphysical character;

　　Secondly, the epistemology of the old materialism is a negative and passive reactionary theory, which does not understand the position and role of practice in cognition, and does not understand that practice is the precondition and foundation of cognition;

　　Thirdly, the old materialism was idealistic in its view of history, and because of its incompleteness, it was unable to carry out the basic principles of materialism into the social sphere, so that social existence and development were only accounted for by social consciousness.

　　In short, the Outline has an important place in the formation of Marxist philosophy. Its central idea is to clarify the decisive role of practice in understanding the world and transforming the world, and to establish the central position of the scientific concept of practice in philosophy, marking the break between Marxist philosophy and the old philosophy, and thus the establishment of a brand-new philosophical system on the scientific concept of practice. Of course, this understanding is fixed in a certain time and space, a certain understanding of the conditions of the foundation, we can not therefore deny Feuerbach in philosophy, especially in the critique of Hegel's idealist philosophy, from the structure of materialist philosophy on the outstanding contribution. Moreover, Marx's philosophical achievements are based on Feuerbach's philosophy, and to a certain extent developed Feuerbach's materialist philosophy; from a certain point of view, to a certain extent, without Feuerbach there would be no Marxist philosophy.

　　Our reading of the Outline today is undoubtedly of great guiding significance to the socialist modernization currently under way. Socialism is essentially an innovative endeavor, and practical innovation is the life of socialism. Under the guidance of the Marxist concept of scientific practice, people should be guided to carry out practical innovation in a scientific manner, not only by adhering to the scientific principles of Marxism to guide the practice of socialist reform and construction, but also by summarizing the lessons learned, elevating the perceptual understanding gained during the reform and exploration to rational understanding, which should be put to the test and used to guide the practice, resolving the problem that there are no lessons to be learnt from pioneering practice, correcting all kinds of wrong tendencies, and not only resolving the problem of the lack of practical innovation. We should solve the problem that there are no lessons to be learned from the pioneering practices, correct various wrong tendencies, and not only improve the feasibility and effectiveness of the practices. No matter how complicated the situation we face and how big the difficulties are, as long as we can correctly deal with the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, theory and practice, based on the scientific practice of the masses, and insist on starting from the actual situation and seeking truth from facts, our cause will surely be successful.

费尔巴哈的提纲心得体会 篇4

　　关键词：

　　提纲；实践观；现实意义

　　《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》虽然是马克思写的一篇笔记，但却是实现人类哲学史上伟大革命变革过程中的一份纲领性文献，是马克思思想发展史上一个极为重要的文本，曾被恩格斯称之为“作为新世界观的天才萌芽的第一个文件”。在文章当中，马克思与费尔巴哈的关系开始完全破裂，反对费尔巴哈的思想，马克思认为他的思想不全面，首次提出马克思主义的基本思想要具有实践性，首次认为实践应该是人们的一种活动，可以改造整个世界，并且可以检验是否为真理，是一切物质生活的根本，相对比较旧的哲学思想与此思想可以通过实践来区分，可以在提纲中有所体现，还认为实践是提纲的核心部分，它也是马克思基本思想的核心部分。因而可以得出，认真的学习研究实践的思想，可以让我们更好的理解马克思主义思想，更好的坚持马克思主义思想，认真贯彻学习马克思主义思想可以更好的建设我国社会主义，对人们还有一定的指导意义，有着深刻的现实意义。

　　一、如何产生“实践”

　　马克思和恩格斯一致认为“提纲”是新旧唯物主义思想的转变过程中经历的环节。马克思在《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中指出：旧唯物主义的立足点是‘市民’社会；新唯物主义的立足点则是人类社会或社会化了的人类[2]。费尔巴哈的思想主要是从理性看待问题，但是他的思想是一种形而上学的思想，具有一定的抽象性。但是费尔巴哈是思想还不完全是只是理性，同时还有一定的感性，具有直观性，他认为直观的事物在空间上是真实存在的。虽然费尔巴哈的思想貌似是具有直观的感性，但是他是从单个物质上来看待的直观感性，从而还是具有抽象性的；换个角度看问题的话，直观感性的物质是在空间上真实存在的，与现实生活有一定的联系。

　　实践的思想早就产生了，尤其是唯心主义早已发现了实践的思想。例如黑格尔曾经在关于实践方面提出过很多与众不同但是有意义的想法。他把实践看的很重要，把实践放入了自己的哲学思想当中。他曾经就提出过实践相对于理论来说非常的重要，理论要结合实践才可以得到更好的理论思想，理论要基于实践的基础上。他认为要想成为真理，就需要通过实践来证明，慢慢的形成真理。所以，唯心主义没有认识到真正的实践思想，虽然也是慢慢的发展了，但是没有从根本上得到真正的发展。唯心主义不清楚真正的实践思想是什么样的，只是自认为的理想形态方面认知的实践。

　　旧唯物主义还是有一点自己的实践观念的。与此同时，他们还认为实践应该是一种物质活动，但是他们说的物质活动并不是我们所认为的实践，不是那种改造客观世界的实践，他们认为的物质活动是人们保证正常生活的比较低级的活动。他们根本没有看到实践的本质，只是看到表面的实践，没有真正的理解实践。所以，这肯定会使得旧唯物主义是一种形而上学，并且具有不彻底性，这样他们对自然、社会以及看待一些问题必然会导致一种错误的认识。马克思认真的分析了物质的活动，并且从哲学抽象的角度进行了认识，从而产生了实践观。

　　二、认识实践

　　人类拥有的活动之一就是认识，这是人类独有的，认识是人类一种独特的反映。人类的认识过程就是人们思想在不断的变化的过程，是主观的认识过程，既通过人类的大脑的思维和人类其他的器官来完成，也要通过一定的意识思维来完成。人类的思维是长期慢慢发展形成的，人类的思维是在慢慢的变化，越来越成熟，但是思维不是自然界自然生成的，而是通过人类长期的实践活动而不断形成的，并且在不断的发展变化。

　　（一）实践是人类认识世界的基础

　　认识都是在实践的基础上慢慢发展形成的，并且在不断的发展变化。认识了世界并且在不断的改造世界，认识就是在改造世界的时候慢慢形成的。我们也是在不断的实践当中不断的认识自我，改变自我。

　　人类在不断的接触事物，慢慢的认识这个事物。本身客观的事物就是存在于空间当中的，只是人类在不断的认识当中，需要一个过程。但是认识的过程当中也是通过不断的摸索，不断的实践，才慢慢的认识这个事物。因此实践是人类认识世界的基础。

　　（二）实践的主体是人

　　马克思认为人类的社会生活是实践，人的本质也是实践。怎么样才可以认识一个人呢？想要认识一个人首先要弄清楚这个人跟现实生活存在什么样的联系，人与他自身生存的环境有什么样的联系。先是有了自然以后才慢慢有了人类，因而人类是自然界的产物。但是这一切都不是一直不变的，都是慢慢的变化的。人类通过自己平时的实践活动，必然会影响到自然界的发展和变化。人类在现实生活当中，是在不断的劳动生活的，这也是人类的实践活动。因此，人类的实践活动是自然界一切发展变化的基础。这种实践活动，可以很深的影响到自然界的变化，一旦有段时间没有进行实践活动，自然界的变化自然会没什么变化，很明显的发现人类没有从事实践活动。人类的实践活动才是改造客观世界的本质。因此，要想更好的改造客观世界，就要从人类的实践活动重点入手，深刻的去理解人类的实践活动。人类才是实践活动真正的主体。

　　（三）实践使得人们认识世界充满力量

　　现今社会，认识在不断的发展变化，随着时间的变化，人们的思维在不断的提升，人们的水平越来越高，自然人们的认识水平也越来越高，这也是这个社会发展的要求。以前很多事物没有被人们发现和认识，慢慢的人们开始接触和认识更多的事物，认识的范围在不断的扩大。之前被认识的事物也在不断的发展和变化，这就对人们的要求越来越高，需要人们的认知能力不断提升来适应这个社会。这样才能不断的向前发展。人类在社会上不断的实践当中，不断的认识新的事物，给人们认识新事物充满了无形的力量，让人类不断的提升自己的认知能力，这些的培养都是在实践当中实现的。

　　三、深入探讨《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》中的实践活动

　　马克思在“提纲”中所提到的实践，本身具有经济方面的意义，是不断的发展和变化当中实现的实践活动。马克思非常重视现实生活当中的实践活动，也比较重视工业方面实践活动的发展，充分利用自身所处的环境来发挥好现实生活的实践活动，创造出自己需要的物质。

　　马克思对于实践活动进行了下一步的经济学研究，马克思对资产阶级社会的批判主要是侧重于它的交换关系，但同时也肯定了资本主义对生产力的推动。马克思所提到的实践，应该是现实生活的实践活动，这种活动是建立在生产力和生产关系相结合在一起的实践活动，两者相互联系相互统一。

　　四、马克思主义实践观对我国的现实意义

　　马克思主义实践观对我国的现实意义分以下两点来说：

　　第一，学习马克思主义实践可以使得我们更好的认识世界和更好的改造世界。只有认真的学习好实践的观点，利用好我们的思维，才可以更好的改造我们的世界。现实生活中的事物都在不断的发展和变化，只有真正的学习好实践观，才能抓住事物发展的本质，才可以更好的去改造它。

　　第二，学习马克思主义实践观可以使得我们处理好人和环境的关系，人和环境的关系两者是辩证统一的，在处理人和环境关系时，要充分利用好实践的观点，从而实现人与自然的和谐相处，不断的向前发展。（作者单位：广西民族大学）

　　参考文献：

　　[1] 恩格斯.费尔巴哈和德国古典哲学的终结：1888年单行本序言[M].北京：人民出版社，1980.

　　[2] 马克思.关于费尔巴哈的提纲[M].马克思恩格斯选集：第1卷[C].北京：人民出版社，1976.

　　[3] 马克思恩格斯选集（第1卷）[M].北京：人民出版社，1995.

Feuerbach's Syllabus Insights Part 4

　　Keywords:

　　Outline; practical view; relevance

　　Although the Outline of Feuerbach is a note written by Marx, it is a programmatic document in the process of realizing the great revolutionary changes in the history of human philosophy, and it is an extremely important text in the history of the development of Marx's thought, which was once called by Engels as "the first document of the germ of genius of the new worldview". In the text, Marx's relationship with Feuerbach began to break down completely, opposing Feuerbach's ideas, which Marx considered to be incomplete, and for the first time proposing that the basic ideas of Marxism should be practical, for the first time arguing that practice should be a kind of people's activity that can transform the whole world and can be tested to see whether or not it is the truth, and that it is the root of all material life, and that relatively old philosophical ideas can be differentiated by practice, and that this idea is the basis of all material life. Ideas can be distinguished by practice, can be reflected in the syllabus, also that practice is the core part of the syllabus, it is also the core part of Marx's basic ideas. Thus, it can be concluded that the serious study and research of the idea of practice can make us better understand the Marxist thought, better adhere to the Marxist thought, serious implementation of the study of Marxist thought can be better construction of our country's socialism, and there is also a certain guiding significance for people, has a profound significance of reality.

　　I. How to generate "practice"

　　Marx and Engels agreed that the syllogism was the link experienced in the process of transformation of the old and new materialist thought. In his Syllabus on Feuerbach, Marx states that the old materialism is based on 'civil' society; the new materialism is based on human society or socialized human beings [2]. Feuerbach's thought is mainly from the rational view of the problem, but his thought is a kind of metaphysical thought, with a certain degree of abstraction. But Feuerbach is thought is not quite just rational, but also has a certain sensibility, with intuition, he thinks that intuitive things are real in space. Although Feuerbach's thought seems to have an intuitive sensibility, but he is from a single substance to see the intuitive sensibility, and thus still has the abstraction; another way to look at the problem, the intuitive sensibility of the substance is in space on the real existence, and the reality of life has a certain connection.

　　The idea of practice has been around for a long time, and idealism in particular has long since discovered the idea of practice. Hegel, for example, had come up with many different but meaningful ideas about practice. He put practice into his philosophical thought, and he put practice into his philosophical thought. He once suggested that practice is very important to theory, that theory should be combined with practice in order to get better theoretical ideas, and that theory should be based on practice. He believed that in order to become truth, it needed to be proved through practice and slowly formed into truth. Therefore, idealism did not recognize the true practical ideas, and although it did develop slowly, it did not get the true development fundamentally. Idealism is not clear about what real practical thought is like, it is only the self-perceived ideal form aspect of cognized practice.

　　The old materialism still had a little bit of its own conception of practice. At the same time, they also thought that practice should be a material activity, but the material activity they were talking about was not the kind of practice we think of as practice, not the kind of practice that transforms the objective world; what they thought of as material activity was the relatively low level of activity that people do to ensure a normal life. They have not seen the essence of practice at all; they have only seen practice on the surface and have not really understood it. Therefore, this would certainly make the old materialism a metaphysics and with incompleteness, so that their understanding of nature and society as well as looking at some problems would inevitably lead to a wrong understanding. Marx carefully analyzed the activity of matter and recognized it from the point of view of philosophical abstraction, which led to the concept of practice.

　　II. Cognitive practices

　　One of the activities possessed by human beings is cognition, which is unique to human beings, and cognition is a unique reflection of human beings. The human cognitive process is the process of people's thoughts in constant change, is the subjective cognitive process, both through the human brain thinking and other human organs to complete, but also through a certain conscious thinking to complete. Human thinking is a long-term slow development of the formation of human thinking is slowly changing, more and more mature, but thinking is not naturally generated by nature, but through the long-term practical activities of human beings and constantly formed, and in constant development and change.

　　(i) Practice is the basis of human knowledge of the world

　　Understanding develops slowly and is constantly evolving on the basis of practice. Knowing the world and transforming the world, understanding is formed slowly when transforming the world. We also recognize ourselves and change ourselves through practice.

　　Human beings are in constant contact with things, slowly recognizing this thing. Objective things exist in space, but human beings need a process to recognize them. But the process of understanding is also through continuous exploration, continuous practice, and only slowly recognize this thing. Therefore, practice is the basis of human knowledge of the world.

　　(ii) The subject of practice is the human being

　　Marx believed that the social life of human beings is practice, and the nature of human beings is also practice. How can we recognize a person? In order to recognize a person, we must first find out what kind of connection exists between the person and real life, and what kind of connection exists between the person and the environment in which he or she lives. Human beings came into being only after the existence of nature, and they are the products of nature. But all these things are not always the same, they are slowly changing. Through their usual practical activities, human beings are bound to affect the development and change of nature. Human beings in real life are constantly laboring to live, which is also the practical activities of human beings. Therefore, the practical activities of human beings are the basis of all development and change in nature. This kind of practical activity can deeply affect the changes in nature. Once there is a period of time when no practical activity is carried out, the changes in nature will naturally be little changed, and it is obvious to find that human beings are not engaged in practical activities. It is the practical activities of human beings that are the essence of transforming the objective world. Therefore, in order to better transform the objective world, it is necessary to start from the focus of human practical activities and deeply understand human practical activities. Human beings are the real subjects of practical activities.

　　(iii) Practice empowers people to know the world.

　　Today's society, awareness is constantly developing and changing, with the change of time, people's thinking is constantly improving, people's level is getting higher and higher, naturally people's level of awareness is also getting higher and higher, which is also the requirement of the development of this society. Before many things have not been found and recognized by people, slowly people began to contact and recognize more things, the scope of knowledge is constantly expanding. Things previously recognized are also in constant development and change, which is more and more demanding on people, the need for people's cognitive ability to continuously improve to adapt to this society. This is the only way to keep moving forward. Humans in society in the continuous practice, constantly recognize new things, to people recognize new things full of intangible power, so that human beings continue to improve their cognitive ability, the cultivation of these are realized in the practice.

　　III. In-depth discussion of practical activities in the Syllabus on Feuerbach

　　The practice mentioned by Marx in his syllabus has economic significance in itself, and is a practical activity realized in the course of continuous development and change. Marx attached great importance to real-life practices and the development of industrial practices, and utilized his own environment to make good use of real-life practices and create the materials he needed.

　　Marx took the next step in economics with regard to practical activity; Marx's critique of bourgeois society focused primarily on its exchange relations, but also affirmed capitalism's promotion of the productive forces. The practice that Marx refers to should be the practical activity of real life, which is based on the combination of the productive forces and the relations of production, which are interconnected and unified.

　　IV. Relevance of the Marxist concept of practice to China

　　The relevance of the Marxist concept of practice for our country is divided into the following two points:

　　First, learning Marxist practice can make us better understand the world and better transform the world. Only by seriously learning the view of practice and utilizing our thinking can we better transform our world. Things in real life are constantly developing and changing, and only by truly learning the practical view can we grasp the essence of the development of things and better transform it.

　　Secondly, learning the Marxist view of practice can make us deal with the relationship between people and the environment, the relationship between people and the environment is dialectical unity, in dealing with the relationship between people and the environment, we should make full use of the practical point of view, so as to realize the harmony of man and nature, and constantly move forward. (Author's unit: Guangxi University for Nationalities)

　　References:

　　[1] Engels. Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy: Preface to the 1888 Monograph [M]. Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1980.

　　[2] Marx. Outline on Feuerbach [M]. Selected Works of Marx and Engels: Volume 1 [C]. Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1976.

　　[3] Marx and Engels, Selected Works (Vol. 1) [M]. Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1995.

结语： 在探索费尔巴哈提纲的心得体会中，我深刻体会到了理论与实践相结合的重要性。通过学习，我更加明白了哲学不是空中楼阁，而是扎根于生活土壤中的真理。我学会了用批判的眼光看待传统哲学，同时也认识到了它们对现代社会的深远影响。这次的学习经历让我意识到，作为一名小编，我应该不断追求知识的深度和广度，以更好地服务于读者，传递有价值的信息。感谢费尔巴哈提纲给予我的启示，我将以此为动力，继续前行。

Conclusion: In exploring the insights of Feuerbach's syllogism, I have deeply realized the importance of combining theory and practice. Through my studies, I have come to understand better that philosophy is not a castle in the air, but a truth rooted in the soil of life. I learned to look at traditional philosophies with a critical eye, and at the same time realized their far-reaching influence on modern society. This learning experience has made me realize that as an editor, I should constantly pursue the depth and breadth of my knowledge in order to better serve my readers and deliver valuable information. I am grateful for the revelations given to me by the Feuerbach syllabus, and I will use it as a motivation to continue to move forward.